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Abstract: This paper reviews the dramatic and widely noted developments in the 
German labor market in the past decade and surveys the most plausible reasons for 
these changes. Alternative hypotheses are compared and contrasted. I argue that the 
labor market reforms associated with the Agenda 2010 – the Hartz reforms – played 
a role at least as great as that of increasing flexibility of wage determination and the 
allocation of hours across workers. Until 2010, the German economic miracle could 
be accounted for by an expansion of part-time work, which has since been supplanted 
by a sustained expansion of full-time employment. Supported by wage flexibility in 
this segment, part-time employment represents an important new margin of flexibility 
in the German labor market.  
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1   Introduction 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and Europe’s own growth and 
sovereign debt difficulties, the world has taken renewed interest in the economic 
performance of Germany, the EU’s largest and most central economy. In particular, 
the resilience of the German labor market has attracted considerable attention. This 
attention is justified: Since 2003, employment (in persons) in Germany increased 
cumulatively by 12%, compared to 5% in the EU, 4% in the Eurozone, and only 1% 
in Italy. Even after a sharp GDP decline of 6-7% on a quarterly basis during the Great 
Recession, Germany managed to maintain a trend of declining unemployment rates 
and rising employment (Burda and Hunt 2011).  
The German success story has inspired and informed reform efforts in many 
southern European countries and given fresh impetus to the view that labor market 
policy represents a central element of good supply side policy. It has also been 
criticized as a competitive internal devaluation that may impede rebalancing the large 
current account imbalances in the Eurozone, by increasing the relative depreciation 
needed for southern European periphery to recover international competitiveness.1 In 
any case, it illustrates how internal nominal wage and price flexibility between 
regions of a monetary union can compensate for a lack of exchange rate and 
increasingly, a lack of national fiscal policy options (Calmfors 1998). For 
policymakers, it is of central importance to know the scope for a sustained expansion 
of output in Germany without an increase in inflation. The ability of Germany to 
generate sustained, if only modest, economic growth while avoiding a deterioration 
of competitiveness points to a sustained decline in its equilibrium or non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment. This development stands in sharp contrast to other 
                                                            
1 See Thimann (2015) for a discussion of competitiveness, inflation and productivity differentials in the 
Euro area.  
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large EU countries, although the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Denmark have 
had similar track records. The transition of Germany from a post-unification “sick 
man of Europe” (Economist 1999) to a high-employment economy is central for 
understanding the frontier towards which Europe could move.2  
Wage flexibility has implications for the growing debate over income inequality 
in Europe. Many analysts see the German miracle as evidence for the “Krugman 
hypothesis” (Krugman 1994) that strong employment growth in the current 
environment is only possible with higher pay inequality. Two decades ago, the United 
States and the United Kingdom represented typical examples of this presumed 
tradeoff.  Yet Sweden, with only modest rises in pay inequality, experienced 
employment growth comparable to Germany’s during the same period.3 
In this background paper, I will first outline the salient features of the German 
labor market miracle (Section 2), before identifying numerous competing and 
complementary explanations (Section 3). In Section 4, I present empirical evidence 
to support the hypothesis that deregulation and reform of the labor market (“Agenda 
2010,” and in particular the Hartz reforms) were instrumental in bringing about these 
changes.4 While the labor market reforms were not sufficient for Germany’s labor 
market miracle, I argue that they were necessary to induce significant changes in labor 
supply at both extensive and intensive margins. Finally, I review the central findings 
of this report and its implications for the future of Germany’s labor markets in light 
of recent policy developments (Section 5).  
                                                            
2 See the Economist (1999) “The sick man of the euro" for a notably pessimistic formulation of this diagnosis at 
the time. http://www.economist.com/node/209559. Accessed: 11 September 2015. 
3 Over the period 2003-2014, Sweden’s employment increased by 10.7%; yet its employment rate did not keep 
pace with the working age population, so the employment rate actually declined. Source: IMF World Economic 
Outlook database (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx) and OECD.  
4 The “Agenda 2010” refers to the general labor market reform initiative of Chancellor Schröder in March 2003, 
implemented over the period 2003-2005 on the basis of recommendations of the Hartz Commission.  
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2   Changes in the German labor market: The facts 
2.1  Germany before and after 2003 from an aggregate perspective 
Figure 1 presents some key indicators for aggregate developments in Germany 
over the past forty-five years, encompassing the last period of strong preunification 
growth (the mid-1980s), a unification boom (1990-2002) and longer-term slump 
punctuated by the Neuer Markt/dot-com boom (1997-2000). The first three panels 
present annual data for the standardized unemployment rate (ILO concept), the 
employment ratio, and the implied labor force participation rate. The fourth panel, 
which displays real GDP, reveals a period of growth malaise, beginning with a post-
unification hangover and further slowing after the introduction of the Euro. The first 
panel confirms a pattern of unemployment rates observed since the oil shocks in the 
1970s until 2005: every successive recession raised the trend rate of equilibrium 
unemployment around which the economy fluctuated. This “hysteresis” (Blanchard 
and Summers 1986) or at least an unusually high degree of time series persistence 
(Barro 1988) is generally attributed to institutions which create insiders and outsiders 
in the labor market (Lindbeck and Snower 1986,1987; Calmfors and Driffill 1988) as 
well as upward-ratcheting of unemployment benefits (Burda 1988). In  addition, 
generous level of social insurance financed via “Bismarckian” funding schemes (i.e. 
taxing the wage bill) led to unsustainable increases in payroll tax rates (Burda and 
Weder, 2015) with negative effects on employment levels (Daveri and Tabellini, 
2000).  The four panels taken together summarize the German labor “miracle”: A 
sustained reduction of unemployment rates, steady increases in the employment ratio 
starting in 2003 and rising labor force participation throughout, despite a significant 
slowdown in trend economic growth. 
   4   
Figure 1  Key labor and macro indicators, Germany, 1970-2014 
 
(a) Unemployment (ILO concept, Eurostat), percent of the labor force 
 (b) Employment ratio, percent of the working age population  
  (c) Labor force participation rate, percent of the working age population 
    (d) Real GDP, logarithmic scale, millions of Euros in 2010 prices 
 
Note: Real GDP index, chained series, 2010 Euros. West Germany until 1990, Germany thereafter. Participation rate 
computed as e/(1-u), where e=employment ratio and u=unemployment rate. 
Sources: AMECO database http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm.  
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The panels of Figure 1 show a sustained turnaround in unemployment rates 
which began in 2005, coinciding with the return to growth in the previous year. In the 
course of the recovery, unemployment declined with a lag as would be expected, but 
continued to fall throughout the next decade, despite the Great Recession.  
What can explain the German employment miracle? It is useful to start at the 
macroeconomic level, with the guidance of microeconomic fundamentals. In a market 
economy, the employability of labor reflects its value in production processes –
productivity measured as value-added (GDP) per person or per hour – compared with 
its cost to firms. These costs include not only direct wage costs but also contributions 
to social insurance as well as amortization of unobservable training costs and 
expected costs arising in case of dismissal. When the marginal productivity of labor 
exceeds the cost of that labor, workers are hired or existing workers work more hours, 
ceteris paribus. (Naturally, conditions of aggregate demand are also relevant for the 
short-term determination of employment.) In practice, the standard measure of 
competitiveness is unit labor costs, the ratio of total hourly labor costs to hourly labor 
productivity. Because different sectors have different levels of productivity, 
aggregate level measures are influenced by the sectoral composition of output and are 
thus not directly comparable across countries. The change in unit labor costs from 
year to year, however, at the economy-wide or sectoral level, represents a useful 
metric of changing competitiveness that can be compared across countries – assuming 
the base year is chosen appropriately.  
Figure 2 presents a second set of measures related to nominal aggregate labor 
costs since 1980: Nominal unit labor costs, nominal hourly wages and real labor 
productivity. These indicators point to aggregate wage moderation beginning in the 
mid-1990s and continuing for fifteen years. Productivity growth continued until the 
   6   
2000 decade, when it slowed marginally at first, then fell markedly in the Great 
Recession. In the meantime, hourly productivity appears to have recovered trend 
growth, and hourly earnings as well, albeit after a longer period of stagnation.  
 
Figure 2  Aggregate labor cost and productivity, total economy, 1970-2015 
(a) Nominal unit labor costs, total economy (1970=100) 
 (b) Nominal hourly wage and nominal labor productivity, total economy 
(1991=100) 
 
Source: AMECO. Data for West Germany before 1990, unified Germany after 1991.   
 
2.2  Comparison with other economies 
The evolution of nominal unit labor costs cannot be viewed in isolation; in a 
globalized economy, relative competitiveness is crucial, especially in the context of a 
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monetary union, where recourse to nominal exchange rate adjustments is ruled out.  
Figure 3  Real unit labor cost in manufacturing in international comparison  
(a) Index, 1980=100 
 (b) Index, 1995=100 
 
Source: Macrobond. 
 
Figure 3 gives two different perspectives of evolving competitiveness in 
Europe. Both plot the level of the standard indicator of real unit labor costs in 
manufacturing for France, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom along with Germany 
from a common base year of 1980 in the first panel, and normalized to 100 in 1995 in 
the second. Real unit labor cost is the ratio of total nominal hourly labor costs to 
nominal hourly labor productivity, and is equivalent to labor’s share in value added. 
The latter figure is used frequently to illustrate the degree of “internal devaluation” 
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achieved by the Germany economy since the introduction of the Euro.  The second 
panel fails, however, to portray the sharp increase in unit labor costs experienced by 
Germany immediately surrounding unification (1985-1995). While the improvement 
in competitiveness since 1995 or even after the introduction of the Euro is impressive, 
a longer perspective would suggest more caution. Unification led not only to a 
significant appreciation of the DM in the period 1989-1993, it also caused a significant 
increase in social security contributions for financing the new East German citizens’ 
burden on the welfare state. Figure 2(b) makes it clear that the reduction of sharp 
increases in real unit labor costs after unification occurred more through nominal wage 
moderation than gains in nominal labor productivity, although these were significant 
over the period. Overall, the 1990s were a preiods of slow growth and restructuring, 
not only in eastern, but also western Germany (Bachmann and Burda 2008).  
3 Accounting for changes in German labor markets outcomes since 2003 
3.1  The miracle drivers: A tour de force of different hypotheses  
The last section documented a significant and persistent reduction in real labor 
costs in Germany which began in the mid-1990s, associated first with nominal wage 
moderation which continued until 2009, but also accompanied by steady productivity 
growth over the entire period (with a significant interruption associated with the Great 
Recession). Real unit labor costs have fallen significantly since 1995, but in doing so 
have reversed a severe loss of competitiveness resulting from the reunification 
episode. 
It is generally believed that Germany achieved that reduction in average real 
unit labor costs at the price of a significant increase in earnings inequality (see for 
example Gernandt and Pfeiffer 2007, Antonczyk, et al. (2011), Dustman et al. 2014). This 
has brought it closer to levels of inequality in the US and UK, where this trend began 
   9   
in the 1980s (Katz and Murphy 1992, Bound and Johnson 1992, Juhn et al. 1992, 
Berman, et al. 1994). The widening of the earnings distribution has been linked to 
pervasive labor-saving technical change, the rise of international trade and 
globalization, as well as the demise of collective wage-setting institutions and 
cutbacks in the generosity of the social welfare state. Technical change, in the form 
of rapidly advancing personal computing power and increasing automation of 
production processes, has made many routine workers obsolete. Increases in 
international trade, along the lines of Heckscher-Ohlin theory, is associated with a 
deterioration in the terms of trade for goods produced intensively with low-skill 
labor. The degradation of the labor movement, the decline of collective bargaining 
institutions in the Anglo-American OECD countries, and restrained minimum wage 
policies led to wages, which were probably as close to market clearing as they had 
ever been in the past four decades. The dismantling and modernization of social 
welfare programs also affected wage determination in the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  On the European continent, in contrast, collective bargaining 
remains an important factor, even as union membership fell behind effective 
coverage (Visser 2006).  
These explanations are no longer considered mutually exclusive. Even along 
the lines of factor proportions theory, globalization and trade integration have induced 
continuous fragmentation of the value added chain, leading to developments which 
resemble labor saving technical change. New trade theories related to value added 
and export orientation (Melitz 2003) can explain divergent firm performance and 
worker remuneration within sectoral categories under conditions of heterogeneity. 
The putative deterioration of labor market corporatism, the degradation of institutions 
of the social safety net and the resulting flexibility in local wage formation may be 
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exogenous, but may also represent an endogenous reaction to external influences such 
as technology, trade, or shifts in labor supply.   
3.2  Lessons from supply and demand  
A simple model of supply and demand can yield useful insights and create a 
basis for inference regarding changes in observed labor market quantities 
(employment, hours worked) and prices (wages). Despite its somewhat limited 
perspective on unemployment, the Marshallian supply-and-demand paradigm 
remains the benchmark model in accounting for broad trends in wages and 
employment and remains the workhorse of labor market analysis.5 Shifts in demand 
for labor at given wage result from technical change, globalization and trade, 
including shifts related to intermediate input outsourcing and offshoring. Movements 
in the cost of labor induce firms to adjust their demand for labor in the opposite 
direction, as can be inferred from the first panel of Figure 4. Shifts in the supply of 
labor at given wages relate to both demographic changes, including migration (Borjas 
2003), as well as changes in labor supply, holding demographics constant. The latter 
includes changing wealth and other determinants of household behavior and labor 
force participation, such as institutional features of the social insurance system, 
unemployment benefits and “activation policies” which affect workers’ willingness 
to accept available job offers or expose them to more of them. The German labor 
market reforms discussed below belong to this class of determinants of labor supply.   
The Marshallian labor supply and demand framework has a lot to say about 
outcomes in labor markets. When shifts in labor demand predominate, wages and 
employment tend to move in the same direction. Similarly, a sufficient condition for 
                                                            
5 See for example, Katz and Murphy (1992) and Borjas (2003). In the Marshallian perspective, unemployment is 
the difference between maximal potential labor supply and the observed level of employment and is voluntary by 
construction.   
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the co-movement between wages and employment to be negative is that supply shifts 
predominate. In the first panel of Figure 4, downward shifts of the labor supply curve 
under conditions of stable demand imply falling wages with rising employment; 
shifting demand along a stable supply curve induces a positive correlation between 
wages and employment. Katz and Murphy (1992) generalize this argument to many 
labor inputs: Changes in employment and wages across labor types will exhibit 
negative correlation if and only if demand shocks are negligible compared with 
supply shocks over the period considered.6 This central implication is revisited below 
in Section 4. 
 
 The employment ratio considers total employment in persons as a fraction of 
the total available working-age population. As long as the exogenous determinants of 
labor force participation do not change, the Marshallian market-clearing view of labor 
                                                            
6See Burda and Seele (2016). Naturally, there exist a number of potentially confounding factors, among 
which is the efficiency of job placement, frictions in the labor market, etc., which may also change over 
time.   
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markets implies that changes in the employment ratio and the wage are positively 
correlated. This holds for both shifts in labor demand as well as extensive shifts in 
labor supply. Similarly, changes in the participation rate itself, holding the working 
age population and all else constant, should be negatively associated with changes in 
the wage. A simple formal model in the Appendix demonstrates this point.  
Yet the world may not be adequately represented by Marshall’s market-clearing 
perspective. This is implicitly the view of Dustmann et al. (2014): powerful agents in 
the German labor market, such as unions or employers associations, influence wage-
setting in ways which may be inconsistent with market clearing, at least from time to 
time. The second panel of Figure 4 presents this “Pigouvian” perspective (Pigou 1933) 
of Marshall’s framework to non-market-clearing conditions in which the wage is at 
least partially inflexible or “sticky.” Under those conditions, unemployment is no 
longer solely voluntary (the segmentL–LS) but also includes an involuntary 
component (LS–LD), which more closely resembles unemployment as defined by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO).   
Under conditions of incomplete wage rigidity, a predominance of demand 
shocks will continue to induce a positive correlation between employment and wages, 
just as in the Marshallian case, and a negative correlation between wages and 
unemployment (the wage curve). If labor supply shocks predominate, wages and 
employment move in opposite directions, while wages and unemployment co-vary 
positively. Should exogenous wage changes in rigid wages be important, a negative 
association of changes of wages and employment, and a positive relation of wages and 
unemployment, are implied. In a qualitative sense, labor supply shocks in a 
Marshallian, and wage shocks in a distorted (Pigouvian) labor market have similar and 
potentially observationally equivalent implications for employment and wages. The 
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German labor market miracle discussed in Section 2 is consistent with either a positive 
shift to labor supply, holding potential labor force constant, or a negative shock to rigid 
wages, brought about by collective bargaining. This can be seen in the panels of Figure 
5, which shows that in both cases, wages decline and employment increases.  
 
Interestingly, while positive shocks to labor supply and negative wage shocks to rigid 
wages both induce a negative correlation between wages and employment ratios, this 
is not the case for participation rates, as also can be seen from the panels of Figure 5. 
A positive shift to labor supply, as often associated with labor market reforms which 
“activate” those of working age, should raise employment, lower wages and increase 
participation rates; in contrast, a negative shock to rigid wages leads to higher 
employment, lower observed wages, and lower labor force participation. This potential 
clearing in the forest of identification problems will be difficult to exploit in practice, 
however, because labor force participation at the cell level is not a well-defined 
concept for many attributes. Given these limitations, the analyst is compelled to study 
aggregate evidence and institutional details in more depth. It is to these latter features 
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in Germany before and after the landmark reforms of 2003-2005 we now turn.   
3.3  Background: German labor market institutions before and after the Hartz 
reforms  
It is difficult to model labor market institutions, much less the effects of labor 
market reforms. Specifically, the regulation of collective dismissals, short-time 
working, part-time and marginal employment forms, collective bargaining structures 
and working time accounts are not always readily captured as a shock to the wage 
(although with some imagination it is possible to do so). Many of them also may have 
effects at the same time on labor demand, labor supply, or both. A plethora of factors 
associated with the way collective agreements affect the structure of wages, including 
unexplained variation, would merit discussion. Wages in Germany are set collectively 
for about 80% of employees, and a wealth of corporatist mechanisms enforce a degree 
of wage rigidity not observed in many industrial countries. This section reviews these 
institutions in more detail, in particular those institutions that were modified in the 
crucial reform years 2003-2005. I consider these aspects in three categories, discussing 
briefly the role of the Hartz reforms along the way.7  
Institutions of collective bargaining and wage determination. At the heart of wage 
determination in Germany are contracts governing wages, negotiated by labor unions 
on the one side and with employers’ associations, or less frequently, large enterprises 
on the other.8 In general, employers’ associations represent member employers and 
unions the workers employed in the sector, usually at an agreed subnational or regional 
level (so-called Tarifbezirk). Collectively bargained wages are not necessarily binding 
                                                            
7 Hartz I and II were implemented on Jan 1, 2003; Hartz III on Jan 1 2004; Hartz IV on Jan1 2005. The 
law governing part-time (Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz) was enacted in Jan 2001.  
8 Burda et al. (2008) report that wages for 61% of employment contracts are set by industry-level agreements, 
28% are determined by firm-level agreements, while 11% are determined individually.  
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for all workers, but are for all workers in firms which belong to the employer 
association. Dustmann et al. (2014) have stressed a generalized increase in the 
flexibility of collective bargaining, starting in the mid-1990s, reflected in the growing 
ability of distressed firms to opt out of the collective wage agreements and negotiate 
wage concessions in exchange for job security (assuming consent of the relevant works 
council).9 Wage flexibility – in this case, the reduction of labor costs as well as an 
increase in their rigidity upwards -- has been further enhanced by the widespread use 
of working time accounts (Arbeitszeitkonten).10 These accounts, first introduced in the 
1990s, allow workers to bank overtime hours and collect them as paid vacation at some 
later date. Despite their appearance as forced loans to firms, working time accounts are 
very popular among workers; moreover, accumulated working time balances were 
used by firms during the Great Recession to postpone layoffs, thereby augmenting the 
positive effects of short-time work. 
The Hartz reforms were primarily about labor supply (see Jacobi and Kluve 
2007 for an early survey), but there are aspects of Hartz I and Hartz II legislation as 
well as the Agenda 2010 that affected wage bargaining or even the structure of labor 
demand. Both reforms attenuated the bargaining power of workers and their 
representatives in a number of ways. First, the Hartz II law deregulated so-called 
“mini-jobs” by removing previous restrictions on total hours per week. When 
introduced, mini-jobs allowed employers to hire workers for a fixed monthly payment 
(first €400, then later raised to €450 per month) with no restriction on hours per month 
and a reduced social security contribution rate. This effectively removed the floor on 
hourly wages for flexible labor. Reform of the law governing temp agency work 
(Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz) constituted an important component of the Hartz I 
                                                            
9 See Dustmann et al. (2014) and Burda and Hunt (2011) for more discussion of opening clauses.  
10 See Burda and Hunt (2011) and Ellguth et al. (2013) for details on working time accounts.  
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law. Firms could more easily employ temporary workers “leased” from temporary help 
agencies. Both reforms reduced the fallback position of unions, as  management could 
threaten to increase the use of mini-jobs and outsourced temporary workers, and helped 
keep wage growth in check for a decade.  
Institutions of job intermediation, training and employment protection. Public job 
placement was affected significantly by the Hartz reforms. Hartz III modernized the 
administration of employment agencies and improved governance and management 
structures, thereby implementing a more efficient, service-oriented approach to 
assisting job searchers. Increased pressure on the unemployed exerted by more active 
caseworkers undoubtedly increased the attractiveness and the expansion of temporary 
employment, which had been deregulated earlier, as noted above. Other aspects of 
employment flexibility, such as short-time working (Kurzarbeit), which preserves and 
encourages investment in human capital (Boeri and Bruecker 2011) were not affected 
directly. One interesting innovation was the “Ich-AG” program implemented in the 
Hartz I law, which allowed unemployed workers to convert 12 months of future 
unemployment benefit into a business startup grant.  
Institutions of the social safety net. The most controversial component of the Agenda 
2010 was the Hartz IV law, which radically reduced and restructured passive labor 
market policy – unemployment benefits and assistance. In broad brushstrokes, the 
reforms consisted of:  
 a reduction of unemployment insurance replacement rates and the duration of 
unemployment insurance payments (Arbeitslosengeld I);  
 the merging of Arbeitslosenhilfe (follow-up unemployment assistance upon expiry 
of unemployment insurance, unlimited duration) with Sozialhilfe (social assistance, 
   17   
normally administered by local governments) into a second stage of social 
assistance with a work requirement for those deemed fit (Arbeitslosengeld II); 
 rigorous application of a work requirement on recipients of Arbeitslosengeld II 
involving sanctions on those who repeatedly refuse offers of work from the 
employment offices;  
 in-work benefits to top up working incomes which do not reach social minimum 
income levels (Aufstocken).  
Reductions in the generosity of unemployment insurance and assistance affect 
labor markets in two ways. First, they reduce reservation wage of workers, which leads 
to greater turnover in the labor market (exits from unemployment) and lower wages at 
at all points of the distribution. Second, reducing unemployment benefits lowers the 
fallback position of workers in wage bargaining. Both effects cause observed real 
wages to decline and represent an exogenous increase in labor supply. 
Summary. In hindsight, the Hartz reforms, and more generally the Agenda 2010, can 
viewed as a cluster of measures, many of which were abandoned, while others 
ultimately became permanent components of labor market policy. For example, the 
“Ich-AG” program was successful in reducing the net fiscal burden of high 
unemployment, yet was dropped in 2006, as were the use of job vouchers (both part of 
Hartz I). Personal-Service-Agenturen (temporary help agencies run by the state 
employment offices) were abandoned only a few years after they were implemented. 
Reforms of job protection proposed by the Hartz Commission were never implemented 
at all. In contrast, Hartz III was strengthened by a managerial reorganization of the 
Federal Employment Agency in 2007 and is seen as instrumental in accelerating exits 
from unemployment (Fahr and Sunde, 2009). Retraining and public employment 
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programs are now routinely evaluated using modern statistical impact analysis 
methods (Jacobi and Kluve, 2007).  Of all the reforms, the Hartz IV law is generally agreed 
to have been the “carrot and the stick” measure which shifted labor supply significantly 
outwards, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of unemployed and inactive individuals. 
4  Inspecting the miracle: The structure of German employment since 1995  
The vaunted performance of the German labor market is not well-understood by 
the public and merits more detailed examination. As Figure 6 shows, overall 
employment in Germany was stagnant in the 1990s, rising only after 2003. Yet is this 
expansion of employment across the board, or is it concentrated in certain types of 
employment, certain sectors of the economy, or at certain segments of the wage 
distribution? Is it caused by demand or supply factors, or is it more accurately seen 
from a non-market clearing perspective, driven by an exogenous relaxation of wage 
rigidity in the system? In what follows, we pursue answers to these questions.   
 
Figure 6   Employment in Germany, millions of persons, 1991-2014  
 
Source: Arbeitszeitrechnung, IAB. 
 
 
4.1  The distribution of employment growth across sectors  
The accelerating pace of globalization, the German unification episode and the 
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offshoring of economic activity to Eastern Europe in the economic integration process 
took their toll on Germany’s labor market in the 1990s. In particular, fragmentation of 
the value added chain led to a surge in the openness of the German economy, raising 
the standard index from 40.5 in 1993 to 61.7 in 2003.11 Figure 7 considers the 
distribution of employment across broad sectoral activities before and after 2003, and 
indicates significant restructuring in the period 1992-2003, when total employment 
grew only by 400,000 workers (a cumulative increase of roughly 0.1%), despite an 
expansion of GDP of 14.8%. During that period, a decrease of 2.1 million in 
manufacturing was offset by an increase of 2.2 million in business services. Growth 
in the second period 2003-2014 totaled 3.2 million or a net growth of almost 10%. 
During the “miracle” period 2003-2014, employment grew in all sectors except 
construction and manufacturing (where it was constant).  
 
Figure 7  Change in employment by sector, thousands, 1992-2014 
 
  Source: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). 
 
 
4.2. The distribution of employment growth across types of workers.  
Employment is defined as all persons in any form of paid work during the 
                                                            
11 The openness index is the sum of imports and exports of goods and services expressed as percent of GDP. In 
comparison, Sweden’s index rose over the same period from 59.1 to 76.3. By 2014, the index values of both 
countries were equal at 86, a remarkable development, given their relative sizes. 
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sample period (usually a week or a month), so it is the behavior of hours worked rather 
than their distribution across the working population that is decisive for economic 
growth.12 Germany’s successful negotiation of the Great Recession was primarily 
about the redistribution of a sharp reduction of hours among workers (Burda and Hunt 
2011). For that reason, it is important to distinguish between the extensive margin of 
employment (people) and the intensive margin (hours per person). Figure 8 displays 
the broad evolution of these categories since 1992 using the OECD definition, centered 
around the pivotal year 2003.  
 
Figure 8: Change in employment by type, OECD definition, 1992-2014 
 
Note: Full and part time employment based on a common OECD definition of less than 30 hours of work per 
week. Part-time in employment in this diagram also includes mini-jobs.  
Source: OECD labor force statistics 
 
Figure 8 reveals a surprising, little-known fact: The lion’s share of employment 
growth since 1992 has been in part-time employment. It provided relief in the period 
1992-2003 when full-time employment collapsed by almost 3.5 million and while high 
in the second period (+1.7 million) was exceeded by a robust recovery of full-time 
employment (+2 million employed). Below, I show that this pattern of employment 
changes is well-tracked by the evolution of wages in the two types of labor.   
                                                            
12 It is noteworthy that in 2014, total hours worked in Germany was roughly equal to its level in 1994 
(Arbeitszeitrechnung 2015).   
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The outsized role placed by part-time work in Germany’s employment success 
– especially until 2010, when full-time jobs finally began to grow again – is not widely 
recognized in public discussion.13 A more precise picture can be found in Figure 9, 
which presents the “Arbeitszeitrechnung,” a comprehensive set of working time 
statistics published by the Federal Employment Agency. It defines part-time 
employment as those working less than contractual full-time hours; “Nebenjobber” are 
those with multiple jobs or moonlighting. Mini-jobs, which pay less than €450 per 
month, are classified as part-time if they are the sole job held by a worker, whereas 
they would be Nebenjobs if the job-holder already held another better-paid job.  Figure 
9 shows not only a secular increase in part-time employment, it also shows that average 
hours of part-time workers have increased, a trend that Burda and Seele (2016) confirm 
since 2002 using micro datasets. This trend reflects both a composition effect, as the 
number of mini-jobbers in the part-time category declined and hours worked by “true” 
part-timers increased.14  
Using a large sample of socially insured employees, Burda and Seele (2016) 
examine the regional distribution between eastern and western states (currently 
available up to 2010). Part-time employment in eastern Germany grew more rapidly 
(and from a small base) in the period 1993-1998 (39.2% versus 14.0% in the West); 
this trend was reversed in the immediate pre-Hartz period (1998-2003), when part-
time was flat in the East and grew by 14.1% in the West. In the post-Hartz period 2003-
2010, part-time work in both regions grew by virtually the same amount (West: 27.7%; 
East: 26.6%).  
                                                            
13 Part-time employment is frequently perceived by the public as precarious or “atypical” and favorable to business 
interests, even though when asked, most part-time employees would prefer to maintain their status (Institut der 
deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, 2015).   
14 According to the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung, part-time work is less than 35 hours 
per week, although the legal definition of part-time is more vague, simply as working less than “normal” 
contractual hours (§2  Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz). 
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Figure 9  Employment by margin and type, 1991-2014 
(a) Total hours by full-time, part-time, and Nebenjob workers, trillions 
 (b) Employees in full-time, part-time, and Nebenjob status, millions 
 (c) Annual hours worked per full-time, part-time and Nebenjob employees 
 
Source: Arbeitszeitrechnung, IAB 
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4.3. Trends in inequality in earnings and incomes in East and West Germany 
before and after unification  
In the previous section, I argued that strong employment growth in Germany 
since the 1990s largely reflected a sustained expansion of part-time employment, i.e. 
a redistribution of a given number of hours across more workers. While the number of 
persons in the labor market as “mini-jobbers” and other forms has increased, it alone 
cannot account for the labor market miracle. Part-time employment, in contrast, can. 
Yet it is still not clear why firms were willing to hire so many part-time workers over 
the period while reducing full-time employment at the same time (Figure 9). In this 
section, I look at the evolution of the price of labor to find an answer to the puzzle.  
In a widely-noted commentary at the time, Krugman (1994) surmised that 
employment growth in the US during the 1980s and early 1990s came at the expense 
of increasing wage inequality, reflecting either increasing labor supply or the 
attenuation or elimination of real wage rigidities. For Germany, this point is made 
forcefully by Dustmann et al. (2014). I reproduce one of their key findings in Figure 
10, which displays annual real wage growth of full-time workers (Western Germany 
only) at the 15th, 50th (median), and 85th percentile of gross real wages. They confirm 
increasing pay inequality in Germany already noted by Dustmann et al. (2009), 
Antoncyzk et al. (2011) and others. More subtly, it is noteworthy that the “breakout” 
of inequality does not occur in both directions simultaneously; rather the increase in 
inequality at the upper end begins in the mid-1990s, while the bottom level of the wage 
distribution remains constant in absolute terms until 2004 – the year after the Hartz I 
and II reforms were implemented. While Dustmann et al. (2014) are dismissive of the 
role of the reforms, they provide little direct evidence to support a sweeping claim of 
irrelevance.  
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Figure 10   Cumulative real wage growth at the median 15th, 50th (median) and 
85th percentile, 1990-2008, full-time workers in western Germany 
 
Note: Full-time workers employed in western German states. 
Source: Dustmann et al. (2014).  
 
It is interesting to compare the German experience with two important continental 
European neighbors that share many common institutional features: France and 
Sweden. While France has a rather high statutory minimum wage, Sweden’s social 
partners enforce high collective wage agreements as minima; Swedish unions enjoy a 
very high coverage ratio and little excess coverage, while French unions typically 
represent less than 10% of employment, yet have a voice in the determination of 90% 
of wages (Boeri et al., 2001, Visser 2006). Figure 11 displays OECD evidence on the 
spread of earnings (the ratio of full-time pay at the 90th to the 10th percentile) for 
monthly earnings of full-time workers. The distribution of earnings became visibly 
more unequal in Germany relative to other countries over the past two decades, but 
significantly, this increase begins after 2003.15 
While earnings inequality has increased sharply in Germany, changing patterns 
of female labor force participation in families, increasing employment ratios across the 
population and the introduction of Hartz IV in-work benefits for workers in low-paid 
                                                            
15 The OECD also reports the evolution of the 15th and 85th percentiles in the three countries but the disparate 
evolution of East and West German earnings distributions obfuscates the qualitatively distinctly different evolution 
of wages in the two regions.  
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jobs have mitigated comparable increases in household income inequality.16 Table 1, 
which tracks the evolution of income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient since 
1996, shows that Germany hardly differs from other countries. It is noteworthy that 
while income inequality in Sweden is significantly lower than elsewhere, the rise in its 
Gini coefficient was the largest in the table. More significantly, the increase in income 
inequality in Germany since 2003 was the smallest of the countries considered.  
 
Figure 11  Inequality in pay levels in France, Germany and Sweden (90th-10th 
percentile ratios), full-time workers only  
 
Source: OECD. Monthly gross earnings:  
 
 Do the findings of Dustmann et al. (2014) also apply to part-time workers? Do 
they apply to Eastern German workers, or are they fundamentally different from those 
in the West? It is essential to distinguish between the two regions, because mean and 
median earnings grew at dramatically different rates, and these growth rates changed 
over time; in the first ten years after reunification, wages in the East more than 
doubled; in the last decade they remained more or less stuck at 80% of western levels. 
 
 
                                                            
16 In its 2014 annual report, the German Council of Economic Advisors (Sachverständigenrat 2014) found 
no change in household income inequality since 2005 and concluded that employment and in-work 
transfers largely offset the effects of increasing earnings inequality over the period.  
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  Table 1  Income Gini coefficients over the past two decades  
Country  1996 2003 2011 Change 1996-2011 
France  0.280 0.284 0.310 +0.22 
Germany 0.259 0.286 0.298 +0.39 
Sweden  0.216* 0.236 0.268 +0.42 
United Kingdom     0.334** 0.333       0.347*** +0.13 
USA 0.354 0.365 0.387 +0.33 
*1995  **1994  ***2010 
Note: The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1 and indicates the level of inequality in a wage or income distribution. 
A Gini coefficient of 1 indicates maximal possible inequality; zero corresponds to complete equality.  
Source: OECD.   
 
 Figure 12 provides new evidence that the trajectory of wages for full- and part-
time employment in East and West follow comparable patterns over time, but that the 
declines were the steeper for part-time workers. It displays the evolution of real 
hourly wages at three percentiles of the wage distribution. These data, discussed in 
detail in Burda and Seele (2016), allow the evaluation of competing accounts of labor 
market developments discussed in Section 3.2.17 They apply the framework of Katz 
and Murphy (1992) and examine total co-movement of wages and employment across 
cells (groupings by characteristics) of labor market participants over time to allow 
inference about the type of shocks affecting the labor market. In a market-clearing 
setting, it is possible to infer the predominance of labor demand or supply shocks. By 
adding the additional categories of part-time and full-time labor and exploiting the 
variability apparent in Figure 12, Burda and Seele (2016) show that West Germany 
is better characterized as subject to a labor supply shock following the Hartz reforms, 
with relatively little variability originating in demand. In contrast, the eastern part of 
Germany was subjected to enough demand shifts to dominate the covariance of wages 
and employment across cells.  
 
 
                                                            
17 Unlike Dustmann et al. (2014), the analysis in Burda and Seele (2016) explicitly includes part-time workers. 
Because hours data are not available for the micro data set used, they had to be imputed for each year using cell 
averages for part and full-time workers from the German Socioeconomic Panel. 
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Figure 12  Cumulative real wage growth at 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles, 
workers by full- and part-time status, 1993-2010 
  
 
Note: In each panel, the dark blue, middle curve depicts the cumulative evolution of the median real 
wage since 1993. The lower pale blue and upper gray curves depict the cumulative evolution of real 
wages at the 15th and 85th percentiles, respectively.  
Source: SIAB, Burda and Seele (2016). 
 
 Evidence supporting this claim is presented in Table 2, which breaks down 
employment growth into three segments, by position in the wage distribution, for three 
sub-periods of the post-reunification era. The last column hints that the strongest 
growth in part-time employment coincides with the segments of the labor market in 
which wage declines were the largest, especially in the West. This finding militates 
towards an account of the German labor market miracle that assigns an important, if 
not central role to the increase in labor supply associated with the Hartz reforms. It 
would also explain the dramatic drop in low decile wage growth in Figures 10, 11 and 
12 commencing around 2003-2005, the implementation of the reforms.18  
                                                            
18 Using the approach employed for the US by Katz and Murphy (1992), Burda and Seele (2016) find strong 
Year  Year
Year  Year
Full‐time employment in West Full‐time employment in East 
Part‐time employment in West Part‐time employment in East 
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 It should be emphasized that this interpretation of the Agenda 2010’s labor 
market effects is complementary to the nominal wage flexibility stressed by Dustmann 
et al. (2014). Wage flexibility is a necessary condition for the market paradigm to be 
appropriate as a tool of labor market analysis; yet in an economy with freedom to 
contract, a necessary condition for an increase in employment at lower wages is that 
laborers are willing supply those hours at lower wages. 
Table 2  Full-time and part-time employment growth at different segments of 
the earnings distribution, percent, 1993-2010 
 1993—1998 1998-2003 2003-2010 
Full-time     
Western Germany    
  Lowest segment    -0.5   -7.2   24.6 
 Middle segment -11.5 -11.4 -11.8 
  Upper segment    0.9  14.6   -3.0 
Eastern Germany     
  Lowest segment  -13.8 -11.2  22.7 
  Middle segment -27.6 -25.2 -12.3 
  Upper segment    20.9   -4.3   -7.5 
    
Part-time    
Western Germany    
  Lowest segment  10.5   9.8 59.7 
  Middle segment   4.8   1.5 10.4 
  Upper segment  38.1 38.7 27.3 
Eastern Germany    
  Lowest segment   6.3   -3.7 81.7 
  Middle segment 43.8 -19.1 11.7 
  Upper segment 63.6  36.7 16.2 
Source: Tabulations in Burda and Seele (2016) based on micro data (SIAB). 
 
 
 To highlight the importance of the 2003-5 period for German labor market 
performance, it is instructive to compare employment rates by age group in Germany 
compared with a benchmark – Sweden – around the Hartz reforms. The data cover 
both young workers aged 16-29 and older workers 50 years and older. The data come 
from the OECD and the results are presented in Figure 13.  
                                                            
negative correlations across cells (inner products of changes in wages and employment) defined according to age, 
gender, education, and work experience in western, but not eastern Germany.  
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The underlying idea behind the figure is simple. The Swedish economy did not 
implement the Hartz reforms in 2003-5. Sweden has long boasted very high labor force 
participation rates for older workers (over 50) which exceeded (West) German levels 
by a wide margin for decades. At the same time, Swedish youth generally have lower 
employment rates, probably due to Germany’s apprenticeship system and its ability to 
absorb young secondary school leavers. What was the effect of the Hartz reforms on 
the differential, which under the plausible assumption of surprise – certainly no one 
expected Schröder’s famous “Agenda speech” in the Bundestag on March 14, 2003! –  
can be interpreted as causal?  
 
Figure 13  Difference in employment rates between Sweden and Germany for 
different age groups, 1992-2014 
(a) Older workers  
 (b) Younger workers 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
50‐54 years 55‐59 years 60‐64 years 65‐69 years
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
16‐19 years 20‐24 years 25‐29 years
   30   
Of the group of older workers, those aged 60-64 show the most evidence of 
behavioral change surrounding the Hartz reforms. Until 2003, employment and 
participation rates of older Germans close to retirement were falling, especially those 
who were close enough to the retirement age to avoid significant loss of pension 
claims. In the decade since, labor force participation rose for this group dramatically, 
closing the gap with Sweden to below 15 percentage points in 2014 (from almost 35 
in 2003). In contrast, the Hartz reforms seem to affect all younger age groups. It is also 
associated with a lower employment rate for those 25-29 – possible reflecting 
prolonged periods of study – and higher employment rates for young labor market 
participants, indicating that the Agenda 2010 has affected their take-up of work as 
well.  
Finally, this paper has unearthed a subtle distinction that can help further 
distinguish between market clearing and market non-clearing interpretations of the 
German labor market miracle. In Section 3.2 we saw that while exogenous wage 
moderation has effects similar to the “activation” of labor supply, this is not the case 
for labor force participation (Figure 5). Specifically, a positive shock to labor supply 
and a negative shock to wage rigidity both imply similar changes for observed wages 
and employment, but imply rising labor force participation in the first interpretation 
and declining labor force participation in the second.19 Because it is not plausible to 
define participation rates for most groups and because a very large sample would be 
necessary to generate sufficient wage cells for analysis, I will leave this analysis to 
future research. Yet the third panel of Figure 1 is unambiguous: Despite flat or median 
aggregate real wage growth, labor force participation in Germany – driven especially 
                                                            
19 Intuitively, lower wages on their own would move workers back along a given, and presumptively backward 
sloping labor supply, reducing labor supply and participation. In contrast, an outward shift in willingness to work 
at given population in working age would increase labor supply and participation.  
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by older workers – continues to rise.   
5  Conclusion  
This survey has identified several important facts – some not well-known –
regarding the German labor market miracle. Given these facts, I have attempted to 
assemble cogent interpretations using simple demand and supply constructs to 
organize thinking about the episode.  
5.1  Summary of the facts 
(1) The German employment miracle really began in 2003-5, and not before. 
Measured in terms of employment (extensive margin), the episode can be 
explained by part-time employment until 2010, while full-time employment fell. 
Growth in part-time employment is consistent with enabling legislation in 2001 
making part-time more attractive for workers. The comparison with Sweden also 
supports this hypothesis.  
(2) Mini-jobs, temporary help agency work and other forms of marginal employment, 
while significant at the margin over the business cycle, did not contribute 
significantly to the sustained rise of German employment, especially after 2005. 
(3) The dispersion of the German earnings distribution increased significantly over 
the same period, compared with France and Sweden, for both full- and part-time 
workers.  
(4) The spread of wage in the upper end of the wage distribution began in the mid- to 
late 1990s and is probably due to increasing heterogeneity of firm and sectoral 
outcomes, combined with union concessions or weakening worker bargaining 
power, beginning in Eastern Germany and then spreading to the West. 
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(5) The Hartz labor market reforms, implemented in the period 2003-2005, removed 
a key barrier to real wage flexibility at the lower end of the earnings distribution 
by significantly reducing unemployment benefits. It also increased pressure on the 
unemployed to accept job offers, which reduced the reservation wage. Increasing 
pressure on workers to search raised the frequency of job offers as well as the 
acceptance rate.  
(6) Increased employment coincided with a sharp increase of wage dispersion at the 
lower end as measured by the 50-10 percentile ratio, for both full and part-time 
workers, especially in West Germany. This is consistent with evidence presented 
in Dustmann et al. (2014). The most pronounced declines were for low-pay, part-
time workers in the West.  
(7) In Western Germany, changes in employment and wages across cells aggregated 
from individual labor market data exhibit robust negative correlation in the post-
Hartz period.  This correlation is not present for Eastern Germany as shown by 
Burda and Seele (2016).  
5.2 Interpretation 
Economic theory gives us several lenses with which to view and judge the German 
labor market miracle. A classical Marshallian perspective would simply ignore 
institutional detail and look for levels of wages and employment which clear the 
market given the technology and tastes of the German population. A Pigouvian angle 
stresses involuntary unemployment and the institutions which stand in the way of 
Marshall’s outcome. A search-and-matching perspective in the sense of Diamond, 
Mortensen and Pissarides would stress frictions preventing willing buyers and sellers 
from finding each other or transacting. In this background paper, I have focused on 
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the first two dimensions of the labor market. These have provided ample scope for 
interpreting the German labor market miracle.  
 It is easy to imagine the German labor market miracle persisting for many years 
to come; wage settlements exhibit a high degree of persistence and relative wages play 
an important role in pay determination. Workers presently prefer to use their unions to 
protect jobs, not increase pay. It appears more likely, however, that labor market 
institutions will experience mean reversion to the European norm, evident for example 
in the acquis communautaires of the EU treaties. German unions are presently leading 
a successful political pushback against the use of temporary contracts and “precarious” 
employment forms as a substitute for low-skill labor, imposing tenure limits and “equal 
treatment” after two years.20 More importantly, increases in wage inequality led 
politicians across the political spectrum to enact Germany’s first minimum wage law, 
which applies to all new contracts signed after January 1, 2015, and to all workers after 
2017, with few exceptions.21 It is noteworthy that the minimum wage enjoys support 
of 80-85% of Germans surveyed in opinion polls.22 A minimum wage of €8.50/hour 
represented 50%-62% of the median wage in 2011 (Kluve 2013) and is likely to induce 
an “accordion effect,” raising wages at all quantiles of the distribution and destroying 
many mini-jobs and other marginal forms of employment along the way. While these 
measures may have salutary effects on competitiveness in the rest of Europe and intra-
Eurozone imbalances, in the long run they are likely to raise unemployment in 
Germany once again in the direction of more “European” levels.   
                                                            
20 The law has not yet been enacted, but a first draft of amendments to the regulation of temporary help was 
published in mid-October 2015 and would impose severe limitations on contract service labor and temporary 
agency work, for example, 18 month maximal engagement for temporary agency workers and equal pay for 
temporary agency workers after nine months.  
21 Workers for whom the minimum wage does not apply include apprentices and youth without a completed 
training program, internships comprising a mandatory part of a training program, newspaper delivery and long-
term unemployed.  
22 See for example, the recent Infratest-dimap survey in February 2015 commissioned by the DGB, the German 
confederation of labor unions: http://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++02e12b02-c246-11e4-bfbe-52540023ef1a. 
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Appendix  
1. Market clearing case 
This appendix presents a simple formalization of the labor market models 
presented in diagrammatic form in the main text. Labor demand and labor supply are 
given by continuous functions LD(W, X) and LS(W, Z,L) with standard properties. 
The market-clearing real wage (W) and employment (L) obtain when L=LS=LD. L 
denotes the total potential working-age population or potential workforce; it is not the 
labor force in the ILO sense, but rather the total number of potentially employable 
hours or persons, thus incorporating factors such as demographics, migration, and 
sleep requirements. Z stands for all shifts in the supply of hours at a given wage and 
given value ofL and incudes measures that affect the “activation” of workers 
presently outside the labor force, for example. Using small letters to denote 
logarithms of wages and employment, write log-linearized deviations from 
equilibrium values as  
      SD         (1) 
  
 
SD
w ,           (2) 
where 
D , zz
S    and   stand respectively for (logarithmic) exogenous shifts 
in labor demand, labor supply holding potential labor supply constant, and potential 
labor supply respectively; and  represent elasticities of demand and supply with 
respect to the wage, and z  is the elasticity of labor supply to its determinants, 
excludingL. The outcome is depicted in the first panel (a) of Figure 4. 
 Define e, the employment ratio, as the ratio of employed to the exogenous total 
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available working population: it follows that LLe / , so   LLe lnlnln  and 
.)ln(   e  As a first approximation, e/e  ln e = ln(1-uN)  –uN, where 
uN denotes the nonemployment rate, which is the unemployment rate if unemployment 
reflects purely voluntary choice. It follows that for constant Z (i.e. imposing 
S =0) 
uN  -e/e = ¯l  - l  =  (l – lD )/(+ )  =  - w.   (4) 
Equation (4) implies that changes in the nonemployment rate and the wage are 
negatively correlated across cells or groupings of individuals of the labor market by 
attributes. The employment ratio and the wage are positively correlated in the market-
clearing model of the labor market as long as the intensive labor supply margin is 
constant. Movements of this margin can, however reverse the correlation. 
2. Non-clearing labor market 
Now suppose the labor market looks like the second, and not the first panel of 
Figure 5. In this case, the change in the realized wage change w  is given by a linear 
combination of the market outcome (2) and some exogenously given change in “wage 
rigidity” given by w ; if  [0,1] is the weight attached to the market clearing wage, 
then values of  approaching zero represents the case of increasingly inflexible 
wages. Now supply does not equal demand; we assume that employment and wages 
are determined by the short side of the market. The unemployment rate according to 
an ILO-OECD definition, uILO, is (LS-LD)/LS, or approximately DS    and its change 
given is by .DS   23 In contrast, the employment rate LL /  in logarithms is 
approximately  D  with changes given by   D . 
                                                            
23 Note that u = (LS-LD)/LS = 1 – LD/LS  so ln(LD/LS)=ln(1-u)  -u; but ln(LD/LS) = lD– lS, so u  lS – lD. 
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In a market with some rigidity (<1) and constant potential labor force (that is, 
 =0), changes in wages and employment are:  
ww
SD  )1(  


        (5) 
w
SDD 


 )1(  1 


      (6)  
while changes in the ILO unemployment rate and the employment rate are (recalling 
that 0  )  
wu
DSDSILO 





 )1( 1 1 


    (7) 
wee
SDD 


 )1(  1/ 


    (8)
If wage rigidities are irrelevant and wages clear the market every period (=1), 
involuntary unemployment and its change are zero. If wages are perfectly rigid (=0), 
the change in both the nonemployment rate and the unemployment rate (ILO 
definition) equal the sum of contributions of exogenous shifts in labor demand, labor 
supply and wage rigidity.  
Finally, since labor supply is LS(W, Z,L) and log changes of labor supply are 
approximated by w
SS   , the participation rate changes with 0  as 
 
wpp
DSS 
 



)1(
  
1
/   
so 0w  alone will reduce labor force participation, ceteris paribus.  
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